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 ‘Cooling out’ victims of crime: Managing victim participation in the 
sentencing process in a superior sentencing court 
Abstract 
Victim participation in the sentencing hearing by way of oral victim impact 
statements (VISs) is a contentious aspect of contemporary criminal justice. A 
particular concern is that the disjuncture between the legal goals of the 
sentencing hearing on the one hand and the goals of victims on the other can 
generate tension and conflict in the courtroom and threaten the integrity of the 
process.  The subject of this article is the management and containment of 
victim participation in 18 sentencing hearings observed in the NSW Supreme 
Court. It is argued that various cooling out structures and processes 
effectively managed and contained the emotional tension in the courtroom as 
well as assisted victims to adjust to the legal constraints and the compromise 
inherent in their position in the process. 
Keywords: victim impact statements, sentencing, cooling out 
Introduction 
Victim participation in the sentencing process by way of victim impact 
statements (VISs) is a contentious aspect of contemporary criminal justice 
(Henderson, 1985; Ashworth, 1993; Bandes, 1996; Sarat, 1997; Hoyle et al, 
1998; Erez, 2000; Sanders, et al, 2001; Edwards, 2004; Kirchengast, 2006; 
Author/s, 2007). More recent concerns relate to the integration of oral VISs in 
the sentencing hearing (Rock, 2010). Much of the controversy in this regard 
stems from the disjuncture between the very different goals and interests of 
the adversarial legal process on the one hand and those of crime victims on 
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the other. From a legal perspective, legal processes operate according to 
established principles; objective and rational decision-making is highly valued 
and the expression of strong emotions in this sphere is inappropriate. Many 
victims on the other hand want to be heard and express their feelings in 
relation to the crime. Changes in our society’s sensibilities in the second half 
of the 20th century led to the recognition of the emotional dimension of legal 
matters as a proper concern of the law (Laster and O’Malley, 1996). In the last 
two decades there has been a discernible shift – through movements such as 
therapeutic justice and restorative justice – to the ‘re-emotionalisation of law 
and its processes’ (Karstedt, 2011:3, 2006). A key feature of this emotional 
paradigm is the focus on victims and their emotional needs; the concomitant 
incorporation of VISs in the sentencing hearing is intended to provide victims 
with space for their emotions. That this disjuncture has the potential to 
produce potential for tension and conflict in the courtroom and bring the law 
into disrepute was recently demonstrated in a Victorian case, Borthwick 
[2010] VSC 613 (Iaria, 2010; Fogarty, 2010).i 
It is only in recent times that research has started to emerge with 
regard victim participation in the actual sentencing hearing (Rock 2010). This 
article aims to contribute to this emerging body of research by exploring 
findings from an observation study of sentencing hearings of homicide 
offenders in the NSW Supreme Court.ii The subject of this article will be the 
containment and management of victim participation through oral VISs in the 
courtroom. 
 Since 1997, members of the deceased victim’s family statutorily 
described as ‘family victims’, have been entitled by statute to submit a VIS to 
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the sentencing hearing in matters where the deceased victim has died as a 
result of the offence. iii  From 2003, family victims have also had the option of 
reading their VISs aloud to the sentencing court.iv  The study found that while 
the levels of emotional tension in the courtroom were raised in those matters 
where VISs were read aloud to the court, proceedings nonetheless remained 
orderly in all but one matter. Moreover to the writer’s knowledge, there were 
no media reports of victim dissatisfaction.  
Goffman’s ‘cooling out’ process (Goffman, 1952) provides the 
conceptual framework for analysing these findings. It is argued that family 
victims were ‘cooled out’ by various legal structures and processes so as to 
manage and contain the emotional tension in the courtroom as well as assist 
victims to adjust to the legal constraints and the compromise inherent in their 
position in the process. The cooling out structures and processes 
demonstrated an empathic response to the situation and concerns of victims. 
Part one outlines the disjuncture between the goals and interests of the 
adversarial sentencing process on the one hand and family victims on the 
other and illustrates this disjuncture through Borthwick. Findings from the 
recent UK study of VISs in the courtroom are also outlined.  Part two sets out 
findings from the observation study which are then analysed through the 
‘cooling out’ framework in part three.  
1. The Disjuncture between family victims and legal process 
There are three major aspects to this disjuncture: the adversarial form 
of legal proceedings, the narrow legal focus of the sentencing hearing and the 
expressive function of VISs.  
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The adversarial form of legal proceedings 
Legal proceedings take an adversarial form which means that the sentencing 
hearing is conducted by two opposing and partisan parties – the prosecution 
who prosecutes the charge on behalf of the Crown (representing the State 
and the community, here called ‘the Crown’) and the defendant. Only the 
Crown and the defendant have legal ‘standing’ to participate in the hearing by 
presenting and scrutinising evidence and making submissions in relation to 
penalty. These official parties shape the hearing, identify the contentious 
issues, determine the evidence and influence penalty.  Family victims are not 
parties and excluded from this process. The proceedings are managed by an 
independent and impartial sentencing judge who determines the penalty 
(Spigelman 2004).  
Moreover, as non-parties, family victims are physically excluded from 
the conduct of the hearing. The adversarial form of the hearing configures the 
courtroom space into a series of clearly demarcated and hierarchical zones 
(Tait, 2001; Mulcahy, 2011). The business of the hearing - taking evidence, 
hearing witnesses, making submissions and imposing penalty - takes place in 
the body of the courtroom, here called the ‘central performance zone’. Only 
the judge, the parties and their legal representatives are permitted in this zone 
during the hearing; ‘outsiders’ enter by invitation. Family victims are not 
allocated space in this zone and of necessity they join members of the public 
in the public gallery as the ‘audience’ to the hearing. The public gallery is a 
zone established at the rear of the courtroom physically separated from the 
central performance zone by a railing or some other barrier.  From this region, 
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the view of the hearing may be restricted and the audibility of the proceedings 
varies in quality. 
In contrast in civil law jurisdictions, family victims are included in the 
proceedings as partie civile. Tait describes a French murder trial in which the 
family victims were “fully included” being located in the performance zone and 
able to ask questions of the defendant (Tait, 2001: 207-208). 
The legal focus of the hearing 
The focus of the hearing is the defendant: the circumstances of the 
defendant’s crime, the defendant’s personal situation and the defendant’s 
future. Viewed from a narrow legal perspective, the sentencing hearing aims 
to evaluate the seriousness of the offence and determine the appropriate 
punishment for the offender according to law. The parties tender evidence to 
the court relevant to the nature of the killing and the defendant’s culpability as 
well as any particular mitigating and/or aggravating factors that might affect 
penalty. While the maximum penalty is prescribed by statute, the ultimate 
penalty imposed is a function of the judge’s discretion guided by the relevant 
legislative and common law principles such as retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation and protection of the community.v   
The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) provides family 
victims with a limited opportunity to participate in this process through the 
submission of VISs that recount the impact of the deceased’s death on his or 
her family.vi From a legal perspective however, it is unclear whether the 
purpose of such a statement is to influence the penalty imposed. Little 
guidance is provided in the legislation which simply directs the court to take 
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account of VISs from family victims in the determination of penalty only “if it 
considers that it is appropriate to do so.” The NSW Supreme Court has taken 
the view, however,   that it is not appropriate to take account of such VISs 
from family victims because the resulting penalty might reflect not the 
culpability of the offender but instead the value and worthiness of the 
deceased person (R v Previtera, R v FD; R v JD, Author/s 2007, 
Kirchenghast, 2005)vii (). The more valuable and worthy the deceased, the 
greater the impact of the death on the deceased’s family, the greater the harm 
caused by the offence and the greater the penalty imposed. Thus not only are 
family victims practically and physically excluded from the conduct of the 
sentencing hearing, but their VIS will not influence the penalty ultimately 
imposed. 
The expressive function of VISs 
 Despite not being relevant to determining penalty in NSW, VISs do 
serve an expressive function that is particularly important from a victim’s 
perspective (Roberts and Erez, 2010, Ministry of Justice, 2008, Department of 
Justice, 2009). In R v FD; R v FD; R v JD,viii Sully J identified that expressive 
function as according: 
[v]ictims of crime, and especially the victims of violent crime, a forum in 
which they can make a public statement in words of their own choosing in 
order to have the emotional catharsis of ensuring that their grief and loss 
has not been ignored altogether or expressed in what they see as an 
inadequate way. 
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Through this mechanism, enhanced if the VIS is read aloud to the court, 
family victims acquire a much wanted ‘voice’ and an opportunity to be seen 
and heard in the hearing. Family victims are able to describe their 
experiences, express their feelings about their loss, make their deceased 
family member visible to the court and become involved in the sentencing 
hearing rather than remaining the silenced bystander (Roberts and Erez, 
2010). In contrast to the perceived rights of defendants, a frustrating issue for 
many family victims however, is that they cannot say what they want; they are 
constrained by law and limited to describing the impact of the deceased’s 
death on their family (Rock, 2010, Department of Justice, 2009).  Even more 
frustrating for many victims is the fact that they do not have control over their 
VISs. In the first place, VISs can be edited by the Crown before the 
sentencing hearing. Further once in the court, the defendant can object to the 
content of a VIS and, if it is does not comply with the law it may be edited and 
parts deleted altogether in open court.  
The expressive function of a VIS read aloud to the court has been 
regarded as problematic by many legal practitioners (Rock, 2010). In 
describing the grief and suffering experienced as a result of the deceased’s 
death, the content of VISs is highly subjective, the language emotive and the 
oral presentation of those statements allows the expression of strong 
emotions in the courtroom (Author/s, 2001, Hinton, 1996).  From a legal 
perspective, the principle of a fair hearing entitles the defendant to be heard in 
his or her defence and have his or her penalty determined in a neutral and 
objective forum. The concern is that oral VISs “laden with emotionality, 
potentially uncontrolled, lacking the calm, dispassionate tones of criminal 
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procedure” (Rock, 2008: 116-117) might detract from the neutrality and 
fairness of the sentencing hearing itself (Justice Strategy Unit (SA), 1999:141, 
Chalmers et al, 2007: 377). 
Borthwickix 
According to the law in Victoria, family victims are able to submit VISs but 
unlike NSW, those VISs are relevant to the determination of penalty.x 
Borthwick was convicted of the manslaughter of Mark Zimmer and at the 
sentencing hearing in September 2010 family victims submitted VISs wanting 
to read them aloud.xi The defence objected to content of the statements on 
the basis that it did not relate to the impact of the offence on the family as 
required by law. According to media reports, the court then spent some 90 
minutes reviewing the objections, editing and deleting ‘inadmissible’ material 
in open court.  Apparently no explanation was provided as to why the material 
was deleted other than the judge reportedly saying: “Of course victims can 
feel these things, but as we all know the law governs what can be in a victim 
impact statement” (Fogarty, 2010). Amended versions were then handed back 
to the family victims who appeared appalled at the outcome. It was reported 
that the deceased’s sister tore her VIS in two pieces and ‘stormed out of the 
courtroom in tears. Outside she told media: ‘My heart was on those pieces of 
paper and they have just destroyed them’ (Iaria, 2010) Later, the deceased’s 
father told ABC Radio National (2011): 
we came to court today expecting to have our day in court and to be 
able to read our impact statements in front of the court; only to hear 
that the defence had objections to our statements and that the defence 
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wanted to edit our statements, and then we also found out that it was 
their right to edit our statements. We couldn't tell the court how we felt, 
it was up to the defence to be able to edit how we felt. 
Members of the deceased’s family subsequently gave media interviews 
about their distress and anger at their experiences in the courtroom. The case 
received wide media coverage and led to calls to review the way VISs are 
handled in the courtroom.  As a result a new practice direction was 
implemented in May 2011 for sentencing hearings in the Victorian Supreme 
Court; in summary copies of VISs are to be supplied to the defence at least 10 
days before the hearing and the Crown and defence are required to confer 
with regard to any contentious issues prior to the hearing.xii  
UK Research 
Research regarding the integration of oral VISs in the sentencing 
hearings of homicide offenders has emerged from the UK in the evaluation of 
a pilot VIS scheme that operated in selected UK courts, 2006-2008 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2008).xiii Under this scheme, VISs in murder and manslaughter 
matters could be read aloud to the sentencing court by family victims directly, 
or by someone on their behalf – the Crown Prosecutor, an independent 
lawyer (victim’s advocate) or layperson. The content of the statements was 
limited to the impact of the deceased’s death on the family. Part of the 
evaluation comprised case studies of four matters - interviews with all major 
stakeholders (except the defendant) and observation of related court hearings 
(Rock, 2010). VISs were read aloud to the court in three of those matters 
while the fourth matter resulted in an acquittal.  
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It was found that many legal professionals opposed VISs being read 
aloud to the court by family victims on the basis that the associated rise in 
emotional tension could have a negative impact on the courtroom dynamics 
impairing “the dignity and fairness of the sentencing process” (Ministry of 
Justice, 2008: 33, Rock, 2010).  Judges raised concerns that offenders could 
believe VISs were influencing penalty, that proceedings would not run 
smoothly, and that presentation of the evidence in that manner would be 
“overly confrontational”, generating not only embarrassment and discomfort 
but perhaps also “violence” in the courtroom (Ministry of Justice, 2008: 34).  
On the other hand, families were found to generally respond positively 
to the opportunity to present their own VISs and many found the process 
therapeutic. There were however reports of a few cases where families’ 
distress was exacerbated because their statements were edited or their 
delivery curtailed in the courtroom.  Overall the study found that oral VISs had 
a “notable impact on the dynamic of the courtroom” and inevitably raised 
emotional tension (Ministry of Justice, 2008: 31). The evaluators were of the 
view however that this was inevitable at many stages of the criminal trial and 
the crux of the opposition from the legal professionals was that such 
emotional displays were not appropriate in the legal proceedings.  
When the scheme was rolled out nationally in 2008, family victims had 
lost the opportunity to read their VIS aloud; if the VIS is to be presented orally 
it is now read by legal counsel. According to the research team “additional 
work will be required with all stakeholders, in particular the judiciary, if oral 
delivery of the statements by families is to be taken forward” (Ministry of 
Justice, 2008: v). 
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2.  The study 
The observation study aimed to explore the impact of this disjuncture in the 
context of sentencing hearings of homicide offenders in the NSW Supreme 
Court. Data has been drawn from the observation of 18 sentencing hearings 
in the NSW Supreme Court, selected randomly from published court lists, 
between July 2007 and December 2008. Observations were recorded in field 
notes and transcribed within a few hours of the hearing. These notes were 
later supplemented with digital copies of the transcripts of 16 of the 18 
hearings and 22 of the 30 VISs read aloud in those hearings.  A grounded 
theory model using a constant, comparative approach was adopted as a basis 
for analysis (Charmaz, 2006). 
The hearings 
The structure and conduct of the sentencing hearings reflected the adversarial 
model described above. Unlike the well-documented crowded court lists of 
lower courts (Carlen, 1976), the sentencing hearings were the only 
substantive matters in the list for the session and 15 of the 18 matters were 
concluded within two-three hours. Each hearing followed a similar sequence. 
First, the Crown presented its case through a tender of documents including a 
statement of facts, the defendant’s criminal and custodial histories, VISs, 
additional materials or documents such as photographs or medical reports 
and penalty submissions. Only in two cases did the defence object to the VISs 
(see below) and no family victims were cross examined in relation to their 
statements. Once accepted by the court VISs could then be read aloud. In 
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turn, the defence presented its case, tendering evidence in mitigation such as 
medical reports and penalty submissions.  
A total of 38 VISs were received by the court in the hearings observed 
and 30 of those were read aloud in 13 matters: 22 by family victims, six by a 
support person from the Homicide Victims Support Group (HVSG), one by the 
Crown and the other by the judge.  In six matters, eight VISs submitted to the 
court were not read aloud. The content of these written VISs was not 
disclosed to the court and the family victims were not otherwise 
acknowledged. Conversely, oral VISs were a prominent component of the 
hearings observed. Family victims were formally invited into the central 
performance zone from the public gallery to read their statements. In 11 
cases, the family victims were seated in either the witness box or the jury box 
from which they could easily access water and tissues and read their 
statement with a degree of comfort. In two matters however, the victims stood 
beside the bar table with no support for their statements nor access to other 
comforts. In the sombre, silent courtrooms, family victims were in close 
physical proximity to the defendants and the bar table crowded with bewigged 
and gowned lawyers. Unsurprisingly in these surroundings, most family 
victims showed signs of nervousness such as shaking hands, trembling 
voices.  
The presentation of oral VISs differed significantly from other oral 
testimony. Because family victims were not regarded as witnesses they were 
not sworn or affirmed before reading their statements. Moreover, the content 
of the VISs was not extracted in a traditional question-answer format; instead, 
the statements were read aloud in narrative form without interruption. The 
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emotional pitch or tone of the oral VISs was also very different to the tone of 
other material presented in the courtroom. For instance when lawyers 
presented material such as submissions on penalty, they spoke in measured 
tones, with neutral affect; their language was technical, complex and 
functional. Family victims however were not reading legal documents or 
talking about technical legal matters; their statements were not read in 
measured tones and the language was emotive rather than functional. Most 
family victims expressed distress and frustration and shed tears; all VISs told 
stories of a loved family member, heartbreak, suffering and loss. By way of 
example, one deceased’s mother told the court: 
I can go for a day without crying for him... but it doesn’t last. It is always 
there waiting to knock you down...it is the enormous wave of grief that 
suddenly engulfs you and it’s as if you can’t breathe. You are so 
overwhelmed by the blackness of it that you feel you are going to 
drown in it...the pain of losing [my son] is something that I will never get 
over. My whole life is lived with this terrible burden of sadness...I think 
about him all day everyday and I will until the day I die.xiv 
There was no indication that victims spoke of matters outside their 
approved VISs. It was striking however that much of the approved content of 
the VISs heard was outside legislative guidelines, referring to a range of 
inadmissible material such as the killing, the defendant, the penalty and the 
criminal justice system. Expressions of anger and frustration about a lack of 
information, legal constraints and/or the defendant were common. A frequent 
complaint related to the editing of VISs. For instance, in one matter, the 
mother of the deceased victim said: 
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I am so angry that I can’t even express what I really want to say in 
this… statement. It had to be edited to make it “ACCEPTABLE”. What 
[defendant] did was not acceptable, but I have to be careful what I 
say…This is so unjust.xv 
Some family victims made references to the killing. One talked of “the 
terrible way” her son had died, attacked by three men and “chased like an 
animal”. Another reminded the court that her son had died as a result of “21 
stab wounds, not 1 or 2”. Various descriptions of the crime were also put to 
the court: “a senseless, despicable act”, “an execution”, “cowardly” and 
“unforgivable”. And many victims talked about penalty: “I want this monster to 
pay for his crimes”; “I hope the court does the right thing by me and my 
family”. 
VISs varied considerably in length, ranging from five to 25 minutes and 
the total victim impact evidence in each matter usually did not exceed 40 
minutes although in one unusual case five VISs took 90 minutes to complete. 
Even though several VISs were lengthy, or presentation of the evidence was 
delayed by the victim’s distress, no family victim was hurried. When they 
finished reading their VISs, they either returned to their seat in the public 
gallery or on two occasions, left the courtroom. In most cases, there was little 
response from defendants who remained largely “remote, inscrutable, 
passive” (Rock, 2010: 219) while the VISs were presented. Only in one matter 
did the defendant shed tears while the VISs were read to the court. 
The exceptional case 
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In this matter five VISs were read aloud to the court by the deceased’s 
brothers and her mother’s representative. The brothers’ VISs were handed to 
the court on the morning of the sentencing hearing and two were handwritten. 
During the course of the hearing, the proceedings were interrupted by the 
emotional outpourings of the deceased’s brothers who at various stages cried, 
shouted and threatened the defendant. 
From the outset, little attention was paid to the comfort and well being 
of the family victims. They read their statements standing beside the bar table 
and when distressed, were forced to lean against the table for support. 
Furthermore, the defence barrister demonstrated a marked lack of respect 
and sensitivity for the family victims; at one stage when her mobile phone 
rang audibly, she left the courtroom and remained outside for approximately 
two minutes.  
During the course of reading their VISs, two of the brothers shouted 
threats at the defendant such as: “Wayne you need to suffer the way you 
have made us suffer”.xvi After the VISs were completed and the offender was 
giving oral evidence about his mental illness and alcoholism, the proceedings 
became somewhat disorderly. The defendant spoke quietly and the 
deceased’s brothers were swearing at him loudly telling him to speak up. After 
a couple of minutes the police asked two of the brothers who were shouting to 
leave the courtroom. The judge did not look at the brothers as they shouted 
and nor did he exhibit surprise at this ruckus as he continued to focus on the 
defendant giving evidence. This case was the exception. Despite the 
disjuncture outlined in part one and potential for tension and conflict as 
demonstrated in Borthwick, while the content and presentation of oral VISs 
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certainly raised the emotional tension in the hearings, these emotions did not 
‘flood out’ causing disorder in the courtroom in the 12 of the 13 cases.   
3. Discussion  
It is argued that these findings are in large part a function of cooling out 
structures and processes that managed and contained victim participation in 
the courtroom.  
Goffman’s cooling out process  
Goffman developed the concept of cooling out in the context of a confidence 
game where cooling out is the final stage of the scam (Goffman, 1952). To 
avoid the ‘mark’, the person duped by the scam, complaining to the police or 
otherwise generating bad publicity for the scammer’s business, the scammer 
works to cool out – pacify, console and re-orient – the mark. Cooling out is 
necessary to defuse the mark’s anger at his or her financial loss and loss of 
face; the goal is to “define the situation for the mark in a way that makes it 
easy for him to accept the inevitable and quietly go home” (Goffman, 1952: 
451)  
The cooling out process has since been shown to operate in many social 
settings including American higher education (Clark, 1960). A college 
education was a recognised pre-requisite for better employment prospects 
and “moving upward in status” (Clark, 1960:570). An ‘open-door’ admission 
policy operated in publicly supported American colleges; unlimited entry was 
thought to provide equal opportunity for all citizens to acquire such an 
education (Clark, 1960:570). There was a disjuncture however between 
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students of poor academic ability entering college with expectations of 
advancement but destined to fail because they were unable to meet the 
performance standards (Clark, 1960: 571). The higher education sector was 
required to ‘handle’ these disappointed students in a manner that preserved 
their motivation but deflected their resentment at their loss of status and 
prospects (Clark, 1960: 571). Clark examined cooling out processes of 
specialised junior colleges that assisted low achieving students to realistically 
evaluate their own abilities and vocational choices and strive for achievable 
goals.  
Given the disjuncture between the legal process and family victims, the 
sentencing hearing is a setting in which cooling out processes and structures 
can defuse or reduce victims’ anger and/or resentment, help family victims 
adjust to prevailing constraints imposed by law, and induce them to proceed 
acquiescently within the legal framework. If victims are not successfully 
cooled out, negative emotions associated with their grief, disappointment and 
resentment could ‘flood out’, disrupt the legal proceedings, threaten the 
fairness of the hearing and undermine public confidence in the administration 
of criminal justice. In recent years, the role of the court is “being increasingly 
judged in terms of service quality and its responsiveness to the views and 
expectations of those involved in the proceedings as well as the wider 
community” (Jeffries, 2002:9-10). It is important that court processes in this 
environment, now more than ever in the public eye, be seen as reflective of 
community standards and expectations.  Reports of angry, distressed victims 
who perceive unfair treatment and re-victimisation by the law and its agents in 
the courtroom are the stuff of political nightmare. Unlike the shadowy, private 
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world of the “con mob”, the court is a critical public institution dispensing 
justice and as such it “cannot take it on the lam; it must pacify its marks” 
(Goffman, 1952: 455). 
Empathy is a significant component of cooling out structures and 
processes. According to Henderson empathy is both a “way of knowing” and a 
“catalyst for action” (1987: 1576). As a way of knowing, it is the quality of 
understanding the experience or situation of another (Henderson, 1987:1576). 
This involves reading both verbal and non-verbal cues and being sensitive to 
the affective state of the situation (Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987: 5-6).  As a 
catalyst for action, empathy generates empathic responses to situations such 
as providing information, communicating a sense of caring or responding to 
the situation in a ‘helping and non-judgmental manner’ (Eisenberg and 
Strayer, 1987: 5-6). In the sentencing hearing, cooling out structures and 
processes demonstrate both awareness of and response to the impact of laws 
and legal procedures on crime victims. 
The cooling out processes and structures involved in the sentencing 
hearing will be examined in two phases: the ‘consultation phase’ and the 
‘courtroom phase’.  
The Consultation Phase 
The consultation phase is that period before the sentencing hearing where the 
Crown consults with family victims in relation to the preparation and 
presentation of VISs.xviiCertain components of this phase perform a significant 
cooling out function to assist family victims to understand and comply with the 
rules of the sentencing hearing and adjust to legal constraints on their voice. 
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Prosecutorial guidelines published by the NSW Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (ODPP)xviii require the Crown lawyers to obtain and review draft 
VISs from family victims to ensure  that the VISs deal only with the impact of 
the deceased’s death on the family and contain no offensive, threatening 
and/or harassing material. In this process a VIS, a highly personal document 
that has often taken months to prepare, can be changed or rejected during 
consultation if it contains inadmissible material. Even though the Crown 
‘consults’ with family victims about any editing of VISs, the law is not 
negotiable; family victims learn that they do not have an unfettered ‘voice’ in 
the sentencing hearing and, further, that that voice might be lost through non-
compliance.   
 If VISs were not reviewed, there is a risk that successful objections 
could result in the statements being deleted in part or entirely. Such outcomes 
are potentially humiliating and frustrating for the victim and a source of tension 
and conflict as occurred in Borthwick. Thus the review process serves an 
important cooling out function by both assisting family victims to prepare an 
admissible VIS that can be read to the court and also in reducing the 
likelihood of conflict disrupting the hearing. 
Once the VISs go through this ‘filtering’ process, copies are forwarded 
to the defence.xix  This seemed to be the practice in all but the exceptional 
case where the court was told that the parties had received VISs from the 
deceased’s brothers that morning. By this process, the Crown received notice 
of any contentious issues and can prepare the family victims for what might 
happen at the hearing. In contrast to the situation in Borthwick, the lack of 
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surprise on the part of the family victims whose VISs were subject to 
objections suggested that they had come to court prepared. 
   
Another important cooling out component during this phase is that 
family victims have room to ‘vent’ at their lack of control and compromise 
(Goffman, 1952: 457). And it is preferable that victims express their anger and 
disappointment in the relative privacy of an office under appropriate guidance 
rather than under the public gaze in the courtroom where such venting could 
disrupt the hearing and threaten public confidence. A consultation period 
provides victims with time for reflection and adjustment to the legal 
framework. Of course the family victims were still angry or disappointed as 
was noted in part two but they nonetheless came into the courtroom informed 
and complied with the restrictions.  
Consultation before the hearing reduces the likelihood of these 
scenarios arising in the courtroom.  In this light, consultation can also be 
viewed as prevention strategy which aims to ensure that the victim does not 
require cooling out in the courtroom - a difficult and risky course. 
 The courtroom phase 
Cooling out processes in the courtroom operate to defuse the expression of 
victim distress and/or anger and lessen the strains of the ordeal presenting 
VISs. The object is to maintain orderly proceedings conducive to achieving 
the desired legal goals. . The courtroom phase is divided into two main 
stages: the reception of VISs in the courtroom and oral presentation.  
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The reception of VISs in the courtroom 
This stage comprises the tender and scrutiny of VISs, handling objections and 
amending the statements if necessary. While formal objections were made in 
two cases (see below) a conspicuous feature of the remaining hearings was 
the marked lack of debate regarding the content VISs despite the inadmissible 
material described in part two.  
The following exchange took place in one case after VISs were 
submitted. When later read aloud the VISs contained angry comments 
regarding punishment, the killing, the criminal justice system.  
D: There may be some material there that is irregular in terms of 
content, but I don’t want to make anything of that your Honour. 
J: They will be marked as Exhibit B on sentence, and received on the 
usual basis. 
C: I can indicate there are some sections in there, as my friend 
suggests, that are probably not appropriate for an impact statement, 
and we do not rely on them. 
 This and similar exchanges in other cases revealed that family victims 
were ‘cut some slack’ in relation to what they could say in their VISs in court.  
It was a collaborative effort on the part of the legal professionals; in 
downplaying the inadmissible material the lawyers’ remarks indicated their 
trust that the sentencing judge would deal with the VISs appropriately and the 
inadmissible material would have no impact on sentence (Erez and Laster, 
1999). Similarly the judge’s comment that he received the VISs ‘on the usual 
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basis’ conveyed that that trust was well placed and the VISs would be 
handled according to NSW law i.e. the content disregarded for the purpose of 
formulating penalty. This process of neutralising the legal impact of the VISs 
however was most likely not evident to the family victims (all non-lawyers). 
From their perspective, the VISs were accepted and they could then read 
them aloud to the court. While it might have been incidental to legal process 
and the legal professionals were not acting to preserve the feelings of the 
family victims, the effect was that family victims were not frustrated or angered 
by public interference in their VISs in the courtroom; they were able to present 
their statements in accordance with expectations fostered during the 
consultation phase.   
Further, it is unlikely that the significance of the words “on the usual 
basis” would have been apparent to the family victims. Although family victims 
in NSW are supposed to be told that their VISs will not influence penalty, it is 
unclear what expectations may nonetheless be harboured. The law is 
certainly not made plain in the sentencing information package where family 
victims are told that the court will only “consider the VIS in connection with the 
determination of the sentencing to be imposed if it considers that it is 
appropriate to do so”. xx These words are lifted directly from the legislation and 
the context suggests that it could be appropriate in some circumstances to 
consider VISs which is misleading given the current law. It would not be 
surprising if many family victims harbour misguided hopes or expectations 
that their VISs could influence the penalty imposed. Indeed, this would be 
consistent with Rock’s findings that while the family victims in his study had 
been told that their VISs could not influence penalty, they nonetheless held 
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hopes that their VISs would lead to the imposition of a harsher penalty (Rock, 
2010: 211). Again, while it may not have been the subjective intention of the 
legal professionals to respond sensitively to the needs of the victims the effect 
was that there was no public statement that the VISs were irrelevant to 
sentencing which might well have humiliated and angered victims in the 
courtroom. 
Objections to VISs 
It is evident that objections to VISs have the potential to place great 
stress on the hearing and the family victims involved and cooling out 
strategies are essential in the handling of objections in the courtroom.  
In this study, objections were made in two matters. The defence 
objected to the tender of VISs in the first case on the basis that the authors of 
the statements did not qualify as family victims. According to the legislation, a 
family victim can only submit a VIS where the deceased has died “as a direct 
result of the offence”xxi and in this case the defendant had been convicted of 
being an accessory after the fact to murder. The judge upheld the objection 
but said that he would explain the law because the deceased’s family were in 
court. His Honour said that he wanted to ensure the family members 
understood that they were prevented from submitting their VISs because of 
the law and not because of anything that they had written.  
Such an outright rejection of VISs could have generated tension and 
conflict but did not. The family victims sat silently in the public gallery while the 
objection was being ruled upon and, as already noted, they did not appear 
surprised or shocked. More importantly, the judge’s remarks recognised their 
 24 
 
interest and status as victims in the matter by acknowledging their 
disappointment and taking the time to explain the legal position to them.  
The second case involved objections to the content of two VISs 
tendered. Defence counsel indicated that the objectionable parts were 
‘highlighted’ in the copies of the statements handed to the judge but gave no 
further explanation.  Again the family victims appeared prepared for the 
course of events. The judge read both VISs and agreed with the defence in 
relation to the first VIS and in part with respect to the second. The judge then 
told the family victims that they could only read aloud those parts of their 
statements that were not marked. This was a high profile case and the very 
small court room was crowded with friends and supporters of the defendant 
as well as journalists. There was certainly potential for the family victims to 
have been humiliated and angered at the public rejection and editing of their 
personal statements and these emotions could have flooded out disrupting 
the proceedings as had occurred in Borthwick.  Like the first case however, 
the judge explained the law clearly and at length to the court and emphasised 
that the decision to delete sections of the VISs was neither personal nor a 
reflection on the victims. The judge told the first victim “It’s not a subjective 
criticism of you Ms [X] but it’s a matter we must do according to the law”.  
Before the first family victim commenced reading her statement, the 
judge reassured her that the opportunity to read her VIS “was not wasted” 
because being unable to read the highlighted sections “wouldn’t matter very 
much to the impact of what you say.” The family victims then in turn sat in the 
witness box and read their VISs aloud to the courtroom as directed and the 
proceedings continued in an orderly fashion.  
 25 
 
Empathic responses to the plight of the family victims were 
fundamental to the cooling out processes in both cases.  
The ordeal of presenting VISs 
When it comes to reading their VISs aloud to the court, not surprisingly for 
many victims such a public expression of private grief, especially in an alien, 
intimidating courtroom before the defendant is an ordeal (Rock, 2010; 
Department of Justice, 2009). Cooling out family victims as they present their 
VISs so that they might remain calm and compliant is primarily a challenge for 
sentencing judges; judges are required to deal directly with unrepresented, 
bereaved victims, the expression of their emotions and the emotions 
generated by the VISs in the courtroom. The sentencing judge’s task is to 
both provide a space for the victim’s voice in accordance with the legislation 
and maintain an orderly court so vital to the conduct of a fair hearing. It is 
important that the expressions of emotion by family victims are kept within 
socially approved limits rather than flooding out, that the family victims defer 
to the authority of the judge and conform to the behavioural norms of the 
sentencing hearing and that the proceedings are seen to run smoothly overall. 
While the sentencing judges maintained the ‘affective neutrality’ 
required of their role, most also demonstrated a variety of empathic responses 
conveying respect, compassion and sensitivity to the family victims’ ordeal 
reading their VIS aloud in the courtroom. Speaking clearly and often 
addressing family victims by name, most judges took actions such as 
providing glasses of water and tissues and/or encouraging them to relax and 
take their time. Often as victims shed tears, they would be unable to speak or 
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would stop speaking so as to take a sip of water or wipe their faces. On two 
occasions judges dealt with episodes of acute distress by adjourning the 
matter for a brief time so as to give the victim an opportunity to regain his or 
her composure. Although many VISs were quite lengthy, no victim was 
hurried to finish.  
Many judges demonstrated active listening by appearing attentive 
and/or actively engaging with the victim and their VIS. Attentiveness was 
conveyed through a variety of means including: watching the reader of the 
VIS and in some cases, moving furnishings or physically changing position on 
the bench to better see the victim as he or she read. Some judges also 
responded directly to the family victim as he or she presented their VIS. For 
instance, on one occasion the family victim was speaking very quickly as she 
read. The judge asked her to speak more slowly, and said “if you read it that 
fast people can’t appreciate what you are saying”. On other occasions the 
judge responded directly to the content of the VIS. For example in one matter 
after listening to the VISs, the judge asked counsel whether he should take 
account of the effect of the criminal conduct in depriving the deceased’s 
daughters of being able to say goodbye to their father because this was a 
“very significant part of their loss” and “it just affected me when I heard his 
daughters say that – it is a big part of grieving”. These comments indicated 
that not only had he been listening but he engaged with what had been said.  
 
Conclusion 
The disjuncture between the different interests and goals of the legal process 
on the one hand and family victims on the other is inevitable in the prevailing 
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adversarial framework. From a narrow legal viewpoint, the sentencing hearing 
aims to impose an appropriate penalty on the individual defendant in 
proceedings that are conducted in a neutral, rational and de-personalised 
manner and the expression of strong emotion is eschewed. Family victims are 
thrust into legal proceedings to find that they lack status, control, and input. 
VISs, particularly oral VISs, present the only opportunity they have to express 
their feelings about their loss in the proceedings (Rock, 2010). In Borthwick 
the disjunction led to outright conflict in and out of the courtroom bringing the 
law into disrepute. In the UK concerns that such conflict could eventuate led 
to the withdrawal of family victims’ entitlement to read their own VIS aloud to 
the court (Ministry of Justice, 2008, Rock, 2010). 
 
 This study found that oral VISs did raise the emotional tension in the 
hearings but that any potential adverse impact was managed and contained 
through various cooling out processes and structures. The findings of this 
study point to the importance of empathic responses of legal actors and 
institutions and remaining sensitive to the predicament of family victims in the 
sentencing process. 
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i Borthwick [2010] VSC 613. 
ii For the purposes of this project, ‘homicide offenders’ are those offenders convicted of either murder 
or manslaughter under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
iii Part 3 Division 2 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). Section 26 of this Act defines a 
family victim as a member of the deceased primary victim’s immediate family which means: spouse, 
de facto partner, fiancé, parent, grandparent, guardian or step-parent, child, grandchild or step-child, 
brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, step-brother or stepsister of the victim. 
iv Section 30A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
v Veen No. 2 (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476. 
vi Part 3 Division 2 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
vii (1997) 94 A Crim R 76, (2006) 160 A Crim R 392. 
viii (2006) 106 A Crim R 392, 414. 
ix R v Borthwick [2010] VSC 613. Information regarding the events in the courtroom in this case has 
been obtained through media reports, (Iaria, 2010, Fogarty, 2010, Lowe 2010) and a three-part 
documentary in relation to the case broadcast by ABC Radio National, 25/1/11, 1/2/11, 8/2/11. 
x Section 95A(1) Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), R v Miller [1995] 2 VR 348, DPP v DJK [2003] VSCA 109. 
xi At that time it was a matter for the court’s discretion as to whether the family victims could read 
their statements aloud. Sections 95F(1) and (1A)have since been inserted into the Act entitling family 
victims to read their VISs (so far as they are admissible) to the court. 
xii Practice Note No 3 of 2011: Sentencing Hearings. 
xiii President of the Queen’s Bench Division, A Protocol Issued By The President Of The Queen’s Bench 
Division Setting Out The Procedure To Be Followed In The Victims’ Advocate Pilot Areas (President, 
Queens Bench Division, High Court of Justice, UK 2006). In the scheme VISs were referred to as ‘family 
impact statements’. 
xiv The words in italics were italicised in the copy of the original VIS received from the court. 
xv The word in capitals was capitalised in the copy of the original VIS received from the court. 
xvi For ethical reasons, ‘Wayne’ is not the defendant’s real name. 
xvii Although not directly observed, inferences have been drawn from documents such as Prosecution 
Guidelines and the Information package supplied to crime victims from NSW Victims Services, and the 
observation fieldwork. 
xviii Prosecution guidelines are published by the NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 
regulate the conduct of public prosecutors. The guidelines are available from 
http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/FullGuidelines.pdf  
xix Prosecution Guidelines 18.  
xx 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/victimsservices/ll_vs.nsf/vwFiles/BK03_VIS.pdf/$file/BK03_VI
S.pdf, 4 (accessed 29/1/11). 
xxi Section 28(3) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
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